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1. Assertion1
Assertion can be defined in at least two ways: It can be defined as a 
speech act and thus be distinguished from other speech acts such as ques-
tions, commands, etc. This is what linguists do, and most of them are sat-
isfied with it. However, another way of dealing with assertions – a way that 
has been popular with philosophers for some time – is more ambitious: 
Finding out the norms of assertion, or defining what is a “good assertion.” 
Regarding an answer to this question, we are far from any consensus. 
1.1. What is an Assertion? 
Let us tackle the first question first. The most mature speech act the-
ory currently available is that of Daniel Vanderveken (1990). 
Vanderveken assembles a number of speech acts (or more precisely, a 
number of English verbs) under the heading of “assertives” (1990, 169-
181). Assertives are distinguished from other speech acts by their asser-
tive “illocutionary point” (roughly: the basic purpose of the act) which is 
defined as “representing as actual a state of affairs” (1990, 105). An as-
sertive can be true or false, sincere or a lie, relevant or irrelevant. An as-
sertive is also distinguished from a quote, i.e. the pronouncing of a sen-
tence without representing it as actual, e.g., in order to demonstrate its 
syntax on a blackboard. Neither sincerity, nor truth, nor belief, nor rele-
vance, nor justification is constitutive of assertion, yet notions of “asser-
tion” and “good assertion” are often confused. 
1 I am very grateful for the most valuable comments made by the participants of the work-
shop Moral realism and political decisions (Bamberg, Dec. 19 – 22, 2013), by Robert Hümmer, 
Jan Henning Schulze and Sebastian Krebs. The remaining blunders are all mine. 
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The assertion itself is the “primitive assertive” in Vanderveken’s theory 
(1990, 169); the other assertives such as answers, reassertions or denials re-
quire additional contextual qualifications. Testimonies and conjectures are 
also assertives, but they are distinguished from plain assertions by the de-
gree of strength in their “mode of achievement.” Testimonies are stronger 
than regular assertions, conjectures are weaker. In Vanderveken’s theory the 
degree of strength is a parameter that is independent of the assertive illocu-
tionary point; this independence will be important in what follows.  
However, the definition of assertives as speech acts “representing as 
actual a state of affairs” contains a well-sealed Pandora’s Box of prob-
lems, namely the question of how an actual state of affairs is distin-
guished from a state of affairs that is not actual – the problem of truth. 
The pre-theoretical notion of “actual” is sufficient for most linguistic 
purposes; therefore the box need not be opened unless the question is 
raised as to what makes an assertion a good assertion. 
 
 
1.2. What is a “Good Assertion?” 
 
Searle (1969) also broaches this question. He gives preparatory rules 
that state the contextual prerequisites needed for a speech act to be suc-
cessful or “happy” (1969, 60). There are two preparatory rules for asser-
tion (1969, 66; S = speaker, H = hearer, p a proposition): 
 
1. S has evidence (reasons etc.) for the truth of p. 
2. It is not obvious to both S and H that H knows (does not need to 
be reminded of, etc.) p. 
 
The first rule states that an assertion should not be careless; the sec-
ond rule states that it should not be irrelevant. Both careless and irrele-
vant assertions are still assertions, yet they are hapless or “bad.” 
Searle’s sincerity rule states (ibid.): 
 
S believes p. 
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Needless to say (obvious to both S and H), that an insincere assertion 
is still an assertion, though often a bad one. In the case of assertion (not 
with other speech act types) the sincerity rule might seem to be covered 
by the preparatory rule 1 above. If one has reasons to believe that p, 
should one believe that p – or not? Not necessarily. In many cases there 
are arguments both for and against a proposition. Therefore a speaker 
might very well be able to “justify” a proposition and at the same time 
believe it to be false and utter it in order to lead the hearer astray. A justi-
fication does not necessarily make an assertion a good assertion. 
There are also cases in which belief is entirely unjustified, if it is 
based on misleading intuitions, for example. However, intuitions need 
not be misleading. The reliability of chicken-sexers who cannot explain 
their criteria is one example, another example (Gladwell 2005), is the in-
cident of a group of experts who intuited that a statue offered to a muse-
um was forged and who were entirely unable to give reasons for this 
opinion. A later inquiry proved their intuitions to be correct. Those inci-
dents are not rare: It is not the worst physician who intuits a diagnosis 
on the basis of his experience – and he is definitely entitled to assert it. If 
intuitions have proved to be reliable by induction, then they do not need 
further justification by arguments. In everyday life – as opposed to scien-
tific discourse – justification is often neither sufficient nor necessary for 
a good assertion, as the assertion norms for everyday life are different 
from those concerning scientific knowledge. 
 
 
1.3. Scientific and Everyday-Life Knowledge 
 
Knowledge, just like truth, is one of the most debated concepts and 
there is no hope of ever achieving a consensus. Assertion in everyday life 
obviously does not require corroborated expert knowledge but rather eve-
ryday commonsense understanding.2 How does this type of knowledge 
relate to belief? To attempt to answer this, it may be instructive to look at 
the use of the words ‘know’ and ‘knowledge’ in natural languages.  
                                                 
2 The work published in epistemology appears to aim at a third type in between these, the 
function of which has not yet been made clear to me. 
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The fundamental difference between the verbs to know (that) and to 
believe is their factivity: The verb to know is factive, i.e. it presupposes the 
truth of its complement clause, whereas to believe is non-factive. If A 
says: ‘B knows that p’ she says that B believes that p, and she indicates 
through the said presupposition that she herself believes p as well; be-
liefs are called truths or knowledge by those who believe them. “Factivi-
ty” of the verb to know means that the speaker of the utterance ‘B knows 
that p’ regards p as a fact – nothing else. In particular, it does not mean 
that p is (in fact) a fact – whatever ‘being a fact’ is supposed to mean. Not 
even the “facts” of Euclidean geometry were safe from revisions; even 
more vulnerable is what we assert every day or what we believe to be our 
knowledge. When I hear somebody saying that the earth is not flat, I 
claim the right to assert ‘he knows that the earth is not flat’ and do not 
feel obliged to examine whether or not his belief is just accidentally true. 
I would argue, in fact, that most of our everyday beliefs are only acci-
dentally true and lack any sound justification. 
On the other hand, if A says ‘B believes that p’ (instead of ‘knows’) she 
does not indicate that she herself believes p as well, nor does she exclude 
it. In this case, however, the choice of the verb to believe votes out the al-
ternative to know, together with its presupposition. In most contexts the 
choice of to believe triggers an inference (a clausal conversational implica-
ture, Gazdar 1979, 59), a weak indication, that A does not assent to p. Oth-
erwise she could and should have used the verb to know. 
When transferred to the first-person the meanings of the verbs more or 
less coincide. ‘I believe that p’ and ‘I know that p’ can refer to the same atti-
tude towards p: belief can be very firm. Nevertheless, the weakening effect of 
the implicature in play in the first-person, compared to assertions made in 
the second-person or third-person, affects the meaning of to know by adding 
a connotation of certainty, so that the use of to know is preferred in the up-
per range of gradual firmness of belief. Therefore one can say ‘I believe that 
p but I could be mistaken’ without contradiction, as opposed to ‘I know that 
p but I could be mistaken.’ However, the contradiction of ‘I know that p but 
I could be mistaken’ is merely a pragmatic one: we conventionally use the 
phrase ‘I know that’ to affirm our subjective certainty. Strictly speaking, we 
should add ‘but I could be mistaken’ to any assertion – if that addition were 
not entirely irrelevant. 
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One might assume that the verb to know “expresses” certainty whereas 
to believe does not; however, the words ‘knowledge’ and ‘to know’ can as 
well be used to underscore uncertainty or subjectivity, as in the common 
phrases ‘to my knowledge’ and ‘as far as I know,’ which are phrases used 
to hedge one’s bets, used to explicitly indicate less reliable knowledge. 
This is true not only for English but for most Western languages: 
 
French: à ma connaissance/autant que je sache 
Italian: per quanto io ne sappia 
Spanish: según mi saber/por lo que sé 
German: meines Wissens/so viel ich weiß 
Latin: quantum scio 
Greek: ὅσον γ' ἐμὲ εἰδέναι 
 
Moreover, the history of science teaches us that even scientific 
knowledge is nothing but temporarily received belief that has to be put to 
the test by further regulated experience. Many of our convictions (perhaps 
all of them) are default assumptions. We rely on them as long as there is no 
substantial evidence to the contrary. Of course scientific knowledge requires 
a certain level of justification, which is provided by scientific methods which 
themselves require justification by philosophy of science. By contrast, the 
everyday-life concept – the one pertinent to assertion – requires only belief 
and subjective certainty. The assertions observed in everyday life range from 
those based on scientific knowledge to completely careless ones; however, 
one would lose touch with reality by demanding more than subjective cer-
tainty from common people making assertions. The general linguistic norm 
of “good” assertions requires subjective certainty (that is, sincerity). Justified 
or otherwise corroborated assertions are required by different norms per-
taining to particular situations such as academic discourse or judicial hear-
ings, which I will not deal with in this paper. The knowledge required for 
good everyday-life assertions is mere belief combined with subjective cer-
tainty. It is sufficient to have a revocable default assumption, whose justifi-
cation may be not fully reliable as long as its contrary is less reliable. The 
burden of proof here lies with the skeptic. 
The knowledge requirement appears to boil down to Searle’s sincerity 
rule. However, this is not quite so: A speaker can have a belief and yet be 
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reluctant to assert it. Putting aside norms of politeness, etc., let us consider a 
speaker who has a belief but nevertheless doubts its reliability. In some situ-
ations an explicit guess is more appropriate than an unqualified assertion. 
 
 
1.4. The Epistemic Standards of Assertion 
 
Consider the following dialogue between A, standing in the hall and 
ready to leave, and B sitting on her sofa: 
 
A: Where is your car key? 
B: In the drawer. 
A: No, it isn’t. 
B: In my coat. 
A: No. 
B: Sorry, here you are. 
 
Apparently that conversation is quite natural and B’s behavior is appro-
priate if not exactly optimal. Before answering the first question B could 
have made an inquiry in order to obtain reliable information about the loca-
tion of the key. What she actually did was to enlist A in that inquiry because 
she rightly believed she would get the result faster this way. This is both ra-
tional and appropriate even if it turns out that her first guesses were mistak-
en and she could have found the key easily on her own. Her first answer 
was a guess and it was helpful in finding the key. Was her answer an asser-
tion? Yes, it was both a guess and an assertion.3 There is no linguistic dif-
ference between a guess and an assertion because they share the illocution-
ary point and the difference lies in the context.4 The stakes in that situation 
were very low; the risk taken with a false assertion was next to zero. In a dif-
ferent case, if B had not had a chance to examine the drawer, if the conver-
sation could not have been continued after the first reply and if the conse-
                                                 
3 I use the term ‘assertion’ for all assertives because the difference between answers, oaths 
etc. and assertions in the narrow sense is merely contextual. 
4 For a contextualist notion of knowledge/assertion cf. DeRose 1995: 30 or Sosa 2000: 2, 
e.g. Stanley (2004) critically discusses various versions of contextualism, none of which 
relate knowledge to relevance or practice. 
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quences of not finding the key had been serious, that is, if the stakes had 
been high, B’s answer based on insecure knowledge would have been en-
tirely inappropriate. In such a situation she should have downgraded her 
assertion to an explicit guess or have acted very differently. This means, the 
strength of assertion is to be taken as a parameter independent of the asser-
tive point (as shown by Vanderveken 1990, see above) – it ranges from frivo-
lous guess to oath – and the speaker is obliged by the assertion rule to adjust 
its strength to the epistemic standards of the situation. In some cases that 
strength has to be made explicit, while in others it is unnecessary or irrele-
vant. The obligation to explicitly indicate the strength of assertion correlates 
with the epistemic standards of the speech situation and the asserted propo-
sition’s presumed reliability. Even a frivolous assertion, a joke, is appropri-
ate when the stakes are low and the consequences of “error” are insignifi-
cant. By the way, a good joke can be made a better one by adding a well fab-
ricated “justification” to the frivolous assertion. 
The epistemic standards have to be distinguished from the epistemic 
position of a person in a given situation. The epistemic standards are de-
pendent on the social activity the assertion is embedded in, whereas the ep-
istemic position a person holds is merely the degree of reliability of 
knowledge independent of future action. The neglect of action is a frequent 
but serious omission in the analysis of assertion. The norms of good asser-
tion require a consideration of the role of assertion in social practice. 
 
 
1.5. The Embedding of Assertion in Social Practice: Relevance 
 
An assertion is hardly ever just supposed to represent a fact in the 
world. The perlocutionary effect intended by an assertion is hardly ever 
restricted to merely convincing the addressee of the proposition assert-
ed; a relevant assertion aims at further, indirect responses, that is, it 
aims at guiding the future activities of the addressee. Nobody would ever 
make a promise, for example, if it had no other effect than limiting the 
range of the speaker’s future activities by the obligation thereby in-
curred, as a promise is an investment aimed at the future cooperative 
behavior of the addressee. Assertion is embedded in social activity, and 
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the appropriateness of assertion is not only dependent on the epistemic 
position of the asserter but essentially related to that activity. 
A very instructive example is discussed in Lackey (2011, 253-255): an 
oncologist in a teaching hospital “knows” from a very competent student 
that one of her patients has cancer. This knowledge is “isolated 
secondhand knowledge” based on the diagnosis of the student who has 
reviewed the relevant data, which the oncologist has not had a chance to 
see. The student is entitled to assert to her professor that the patient has 
cancer; the professor is also entitled to assert this to her husband at dinner 
(272), but neither the student nor the professor are entitled to assert it to 
the patient because of the severe consequences of such an assertion for 
him. It is the severity of the consequences that makes first hand expert 
knowledge necessary. The doctor’s epistemic position is the same when 
talking to her husband as when talking to the patient, yet the stakes and 
the epistemic standards differ.5 When talking to her husband, the asser-
tion is part of the language game “dinner conversation;” when talking to 
her patient, it is part of a therapy where isolated secondhand knowledge is 
out of place. The epistemic position of the speaker is insufficient for decid-
ing if an assertion complies with the norms of assertion or not; the em-
bedding in action has to be considered (Stanley 2005, 88, 92). 
Another example is discussed in Becker 2012, 266:  
 
Imagine your partner in a conversation somewhere in Europe needs to buy 
a pencil and you tell him that he can buy one in the Arya Stationery Mart in 
New Delhi, Nai Sarak, near the Vaish Co-Operative Bank. That is true and 
you can easily justify it using the yellow pages on the Internet. Nevertheless 
it is a brazen violation of our rules of conversation: it is not relevant. 
 
 
2. Relevance 
 
The “truth norm of assertion” thesis, which enjoys some popularity, is, 
I argue, absurdly weak. Any speaker in any speech situation is epistemical-
                                                 
5 I agree that when the patient accidentally overhears the conversation not addressed to him, 
he has no right to complain to the asserter (Moran 2005: 22; Goldberg 2011: 192 disagrees). 
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ly entitled by his knowledge to assert an infinite number of true and 
known propositions – about the number of his toes and fingers, mathe-
matical equations, capitals of states, almost all negative sentences and so 
on. This can be demonstrated by the absurdity of the Library of Baghdad, 
which is similar to Jorge Luis Borges’s Library of Babel (Borges 1999, Bor-
ges 2007). Borges’ Total Library is a fascinating fabrication: it holds an in-
finite set of books, each of them finite, containing all combinations of let-
ters (22 letters plus space, period, and comma). It contains every text pos-
sible in every language that can be transliterated by the set of those 22 let-
ters (other letters can be defined as combinations; the library contains an 
infinite number of such definitions, too). Hence, the library contains a de-
tailed and true history of our future, an infinite number of false ones, the 
“Persae” of Aeschylus (and his “Egyptians”), the exact number of times 
that the waters of Ganges have reflected the flight of a falcon, and so forth. 
All of these books are untraceably hidden in an infinite muddle of books 
containing meaningless combinations of letters. 
The Library of Baghdad is different: its books contain only true sen-
tences (not a single false one) in impeccable English, without a single 
misprint. It contains, just like the Library of Babel, an infinite set of true 
sentences derived logically or by other recursive definitions from a basis of 
true and known sentences compiled by a large committee of scholars. All 
the sentences differ from each other, not a single sentence is recorded 
twice, and all sentences are of finite length. Nevertheless, it is as useless as 
the Library of Babel, because you have virtually no chance to find a single 
interesting sentence among the infinite number of true and irrelevant 
ones. Natural languages like English are recursive, that is, you can make 
any number of additions to a sentence without affecting its grammaticality 
or truth. For instance, the sentence ‘The library of Babel is very large’ can 
be extended to the form ‘The library of Babel is very, very large.’ You can 
add ‘very’ any number of times; there is no natural number of additions 
that renders the sentence ungrammatical or false. This means for any 
natural number there is a sentence in the Library. The books containing 
this family of sentences alone would fill the entire cosmos. And there are 
other sources of infinity, to name but two of them: ‘1 is less than 2,’ ‘1 is 
less than 3’ etc. Or: ‘Human beings have 11 fingers and human beings 
have 12 fingers, or (!) Paris is the capital of France.’ Adding ‘or Paris is the 
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capital of France’ to any of an infinite set of true or false sentences will 
yield a true sentence. Let us assume that the set of sentences is not or-
dered according to its recursive enumeration. The library would even be 
less useful if it contained the true sentences whose truth has not been es-
tablished by experts so far (e.g. the distance between the first and the sec-
ond occurrence of the letter ‘e’ in this paper), as almost all of these truths 
contained in the library of Baghdad do not matter at all; what matters are 
the very few sentences that happen to be relevant. Therefore, the point of 
assertion is to pick out the most relevant proposition of an infinite number of 
true, known and justifiable ones.6 Relevance is both as relevant and as easy 
to overlook as the air we breathe because our cognition rejects almost all 
of the irrelevant information in our environment. 
Science is a selection of what is worth knowing to us for practical pur-
poses (of what is relevant) chosen out of an infinite number of truths 
(Bolzano 1837, 3; Putnam and Putnam 1990, 206). This does not imply 
that scientific findings are of immediate use. In many cases the practical 
use of a finding has been discovered later. Nevertheless, basic research is 
justified by the hope for application in the future. Good science must be 
relevant in the most general speech situation of all: the life of mankind. 
 
 
2.1. Relevance and the Theory of Conversational Implicature 
 
“Be relevant!” is one of the Maxims of Conversation postulated by H. 
P. Grice (1975), whose inferential theory of meaning is one of the cor-
nerstones of thinking in linguistics and philosophy of language. Further 
linguistic research (above all: Sperber and Wilson 1986) has attributed a 
much more dominant role to relevance than Grice ever imagined. 
According to Grice and his followers the hearer does not understand 
an utterance by decoding its semantics; instead, he takes the utterance 
together with the context as a hint to the speaker’s communicative inten-
tion. The hearer infers the speaker’s meaning; the most important of 
                                                 
6 Cf. Jary 2010: 164: “There is an indefinite amount of true information, but most of it is of 
no use or interest to most individuals. Accounts of assertion merely in terms of commit-
ment to truth thus miss out on the point of assertion.” Cf. also Jary 2011, 2010: 155. 
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those inferences is called “conversational implicature” or briefly “impli-
cature.” What is a (conversational) implicature?7 Consider the following 
dialogue: 
 
A: “Do your daughters speak foreign languages?” 
B: “Paula speaks French.” 
 
A might interpret B’s answer as follows: 
 
a) Paula does not speak other foreign languages. 
b) The other daughters do not speak any foreign language. 
c) Paula is a daughter of B. 
d) French is a foreign language to Paula. 
 
The information given in a-d) is neither “said,” nor logically implied by 
the sentence uttered by B, but “implicated” through conversational impli-
catures. Given that in normal speech situations parents boast with the 
achievements of their children, A would infer a-b), as B would withhold 
relevant information if Paula and his other daughters would in fact speak 
several foreign languages. If Paula was not B’s daughter but a French 
neighbor, his utterance would not be false. A infers c) and d) on the basis 
of the additional premise that B’s utterance is an answer to his question. If 
any of the inferences a-d) were false, B would not have been cooperative. 
Normally a speaker like A would infer a-d) on the assumption that B is co-
operative – which is certainly rational as humans normally cooperate with 
each other. Cooperation is the default assumption that can only be over-
ridden by substantial evidence to the contrary. 
Another example shows that implicatures are not only important in 
everyday life but also to philosophical matters like logic. When I say: ‘I 
am going to Italy or France,’ a normal hearer would most likely under-
stand that I go to one of these countries but not to both (exclusive ‘or’), 
whereas in a logic seminar you would learn that the meaning of ‘or’ 
                                                 
7 In the following account of the Gricean theory I do not intend to do justice to Grice’s 
texts. Grice focusses on the intention of speakers, whereas I am more interested in a ra-
tional and, if possible, deductive reconstruction of implicatures. 
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would include the case of ‘both’ (inclusive ‘or’). According to Grice the 
exclusion of ‘both’ is a conversational implicature. A cooperative speaker 
would have used ‘and’ instead of ‘or’ if he intended to go to both coun-
tries. The ‘or’ sentence would be true but too weak. We assume that our 
partners in conversation make their statements as strong as necessary, 
that is, if they can make a stronger statement without additional effort 
they would normally choose the stronger one.8 
For all these inferences the hearer used an additional premise: The 
speaker is cooperative. Only by this premise A can infer that Paula is a 
daughter of B. If this were not the case B would not have answered A’s 
question and therefore B would not be cooperative. The relation of con-
versational implicature and entailment can be described as follows: 
 
 
 
The sentence X uttered by the speaker does not entail Y; the utter-
ance is a conversational implicature iff the hearer assumes that the 
speaker is cooperative (premise 2) and the situation is such that the 
speaker would not be cooperative if Y was false (premise 3). Premise 3, if 
spelled out, contains the individual analysis of the given speech situa-
tion. The three premises taken together entail Y. 
The core of Grice’s theory is that the assumption of cooperativity is 
essential in understanding utterances. This is the assumption that 
speakers comply with the Cooperative Principle (1975, 1989, 26): 
 
 
                                                 
8 Horn 1972, 1989 showed that this analysis applies to some (), possibly () and other oper-
ators of rising strength in Aristotle’s square of oppositions (“Horn scales”). 
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COOPERATIVE PRINCIPLE: 
Make your contribution such as it is required, at the stage at which it 
occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in 
which you are engaged. 
 
Then he specifies what it means to be cooperative by four maxims of 
conversation: 
 
MAXIM OF QUANTITY 
Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current 
purposes of the exchange). 
Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. 
 
MAXIM OF QUALITY  
Do not say what you believe to be false. 
Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.  
 
MAXIM OF RELATION 
Be relevant. 
 
MAXIM OF MANNER 
Avoid obscurity of expression. 
Avoid ambiguity. 
Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity). 
Be orderly. 
 
I infer from B’s answer that his other daughters do not speak foreign 
languages, assuming that he complies with the Maxim of Quantity; I infer 
that Paula is his daughter, assuming that he complies with the Maxim of 
Relevance, that is, he answers my question and does not change the topic in 
an unpredictable way. These conversational implicatures play a pivotal role 
in communication; human communication would break down entirely if 
the hearers were restricted to the pure semantics of the sentences uttered. 
Grice was well aware that the four maxims are only a first draft in need 
of specification. One important development of his theory was the reduc-
tion of the four maxims. The most drastic cut was imposed by Sperber 
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and Wilson 1986. Their “Relevance Theory” aims to reduce the four max-
ims to one: relevance. The Maxim of Quantity is easy to reduce: if you do 
not make your contribution as informative as is required you withhold rel-
evant information; if you make your contribution more informative than 
required, you say something irrelevant. The Maxim of Quality (truth) is 
much harder to deal with, as I will point out later. The Maxim of Relation 
need not be reduced. The Maxim of Manner has been reduced by Rele-
vance Theory in the following way: if your speech is obscure, ambiguous, 
prolix or not well-ordered, it is hard to understand; if you have two infor-
mation sources, one short and clear and the other obscure, obviously the 
first would be more relevant to you: “other things being equal, the greater 
the processing effort expended, the lower the relevance of the input to the 
individual at that time” (Wilson and Sperber 2004, 609). 
Unfortunately, Wilson and Sperber threw the baby out with the bath-
water and abandoned both the cooperative principle and the relation of 
cooperation and practice. Furthermore, they revised the everyday meaning 
of the term relevance and transformed it into a technical term. I regard 
these departures from Grice unnecessary if not detrimental, therefore I 
will not elaborate on Relevance Theory, although what follows is signifi-
cantly influenced by the work published in that framework. 
What is relevance? Let me suggest the following draft: 
 
RELEVANCE 
A proposition is relevant 
 with respect to an activity and 
 with respect to an observer of that activity 
iff 
its recognition furthers or impedes the achievement of the activi-
ty’s goals as assumed by the observer to the degree the observer 
(subjectively) rates its furthering or impeding effect. 
 
Of course, an object like a hammer, a non-verbal action, or an ob-
served fact, can be relevant as well; however, all of these non-
propositional entities can be projected onto propositions: ‘that the 
hammer is there,’ ‘that the action is realized,’ ‘that the fact obtains.’ The 
observer can, but need not, be an agent involved in that activity. Rele-
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vance is subjective but it can appear to be non-subjective when a com-
munity forms a consensus about it; our judgments are often mistaken, 
so are our judgments about relevance. Relevance can be negative if the 
entity impedes the achievement of the goals.9 A proposition can be both 
relevant with respect to one activity and irrelevant or impeding with re-
spect to another activity. For instance, a lie can be positively relevant in 
the eyes of the hearer with respect to his activity, and negatively relevant 
in the eyes of the speaker with respect to the hearer’s activity and as-
sumed goals, and positively relevant in the eyes of the speaker with re-
spect to his own activity and goals. Moreover, it can be negatively rele-
vant to a higher degree with respect to the liar’s activities and goals in 
the liar’s later and revised judgment. Relevance is a gradual concept. The 
number of activities an entity pertains to is indefinite; it ranges from 
“taking the next step” to “living a good life in a well-organized society.” 
A notion of “practical relevance” would approximate to what pragma-
tists call “truth” (James 1922, 72–73):10 
 
What would it [the assertion, TB] practically result in for us, were it 
true? It could only result in our orientation, in the turning of our 
expectations and practical tendencies into the right path […]. 
 
This is what a good assertion does: It serves as orientation, turning our 
practical tendencies into the right path. And this is what sincerity aims at; 
when our sincere assertion turns out to be false we have still done our best 
and we have not broken a rule; the assertion of a false yet practically relevant 
proposition is a better assertion than that of a true and irrelevant proposition.  
 
2.2. Cognitive relevance 
 
A further central aspect of relevance is the capacity of human beings 
to select the most relevant entities among the less relevant ones. The ma-
                                                 
9 The term ‘relevance’ without qualification is to be taken as ‘positive relevance.’ 
10 The relation between truth and practice is described – much better than by any (other?) 
pragmatist – by Wohlrapp (2014). 
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jor achievement of Relevance Theory is the Cognitive Principle of Rele-
vance (Wilson and Sperber 2004, 610): 
 
COGNITIVE PRINCIPLE OF RELEVANCE 
Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximization of 
relevance. 
 
Wilson 2009, 395 puts it more explicitly: 
 
The spontaneous working of our perceptual mechanisms tends to pick 
out the most relevant inputs, the spontaneous working of our memory 
retrieval mechanisms tends to activate the most relevant potential 
contextual assumptions and the spontaneous working of our 
inferential mechanisms tends to yield the most relevant conclusions. 
 
We perceive exactly those frequencies of electromagnetic waves that 
are pertinent to our life: light; we direct our attention to moving objects 
rather than to the unmoved background, etc. This is the result of evolu-
tion: higher living organisms have this capacity; otherwise they would 
have become extinct. In fact, the ability to select the relevant is the most 
basic ability of living organisms. This is what human (and non-human) 
cognition does: picks the relevant information out of a messy context. 
Attention is “a cognitive process that selects out important information 
from the world around us (through all of our five senses) so that our 
brain does not get overloaded with an overwhelming amount of infor-
mation” (Solso et al. 2008, 87, cf. James 1890, 402). 
The ability to select what is relevant is the result of evolution. Hu-
mans and other animals have developed several “evolved psychological 
mechanisms” (Buss 2009, 50-53) like the predisposition “to learn to fear 
snakes,” which is  
 
designed to take in only a narrow slice of information – slithery 
movements from self-propelled elongated objects. Our evolved 
preferences for food, landscapes, and mates are all designed to take 
in only a limited subset of information from among the infinite array 
that could potentially constitute input (Buss 2009, 51).  
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The same applies to memory. If we remembered everything we 
experienced, we would have tremendous difficulty retrieving quickly 
those memories most relevant to direct adaptive action. A reasonable 
evolution-based prediction, therefore, is that human attention and 
memory are extremely selective, designed to notice, store, and 
retrieve information that has the most importance for solving 
adaptive problems (Buss 2009, 387). 
 
Animal learning is selective in the same way (Alcock 1993, 50-54): 
 
A hypothesis to account for the specialized, biased nature of animal 
learning is that these features reduce the risk that an animal will learn 
the wrong things or learn irrelevant information. […] Just as the ability 
to associate toxic effects with novel food items should be a function of 
the risk of sampling poisonous foods, so too the ability to learn the 
spatial features of an area should be related to the advantages gained by 
such learning. According to this view, in species whose males and 
females have different-sized home ranges, the sex that typically travels 
the greater distances should exhibit superior spatial learning ability. […] 
When tested in a variety of mazes, which the animals had to solve in 
order to receive food rewards, males of the wide-ranging meadow vole 
consistently made fewer errors than females of their species […]. But in 
both the prairie and the pine voles there was no difference in the 
spatial learning performance of males and females, which have similar 
home ranges and so are confronted with equivalent spatial learning 
problems in their natural lives. 
 
Moths are more or less deaf, but they can perceive the high-intensity 
ultrasound of bats, to which they react by diving, flipping or spiraling 
erratically, and thus avoid being caught (Alcock 1993, 126 f.). The ability 
to select the most relevant does not require a brain; it appears to be the 
most basic feature of life that has been developed together with the cell 
membrane (Campbell et al. 2008, 125, 131): 
 
One of the earliest episodes in the evolution of life may have been the 
formation of a membrane that enclosed a solution different from the 
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surrounding solution while still permitting the uptake of nutrients 
and elimination of waste products. The ability of the cell to 
discriminate in its chemical exchanges with its environment is 
fundamental to life, and it is the plasma membrane and its 
component molecules that make this selectivity possible. [P. 131:] 
Sugars, amino acids, and other nutrients enter the cell, and 
metabolic waste products leave it. The cell takes in oxygen for use in 
cellular respiration and expels carbon dioxide. […] Although traffic 
through the membrane is extensive, cell membranes are selectively 
permeable and substances do not cross the barrier indiscriminately. 
 
My claim is that behaving in a practically relevant way is the gist of 
intelligence, both innate and acquired by experience, communication or 
reflection. Knowledge or whatever there is in our minds is not an end in 
itself, as its purpose is to guide our actions. 
 
 
2.3. Relevance in Cooperation 
 
What Relevance Theory neglects is the biological foundation of co-
operativity and the relation of relevance to practice. Tomasello 2014 
presents a detailed description of the evolution of cooperativity in hu-
man beings. Cooperativity is “wired” in social insects and also in 
mammals like wolves and apes, which can be observed in their cooper-
ative hunting behavior. Tomasello describes the qualitative leap in the 
development of human cooperativity: “Humans but not apes engage in 
cooperative communication in which they provide one another with 
information that they judge to be useful for the recipient” (2014, 36). 
The critical difference between cooperativity with humans and with 
other mammals is the human ability to represent the perspective of 
others (2014, 56, 137 f.), thus they are able to judge what is relevant for 
the partner playing his role in the cooperative activity. Apes do not 
have this ability (Tomasello 2014, 52): 
 
If food is hidden in one of two buckets (and the ape knows it is only 
in one of them) and a human then points to a bucket, apes are 
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clueless [… ; ] it does not occur to them that the human is trying to 
inform them helpfully […]. They make the competitive inference “He 
wants in that bucket; therefore the food must be in there,” but they 
do not make the cooperative inference, “He wants me to know that 
the food is in the bucket.” 
 
Humans “began to make evaluative judgments about others as po-
tential collaborative partners: they began to be socially selective, since 
choosing a poor partner meant less food” (2014, 37). The evolution of 
cognitive relevance cannot be understood without its relation to practice: 
“in evolution, being smart counts for nothing if it does not lead to acting 
smart” (Tomasello 2014, 7). It is hard to see how one can be (positively) 
relevant without being cooperative or cooperative without being relevant. 
Relevance depends on the activities the agents are engaged in. Grice’s 
Cooperative Principle demands (1975, 1989, 26) the following:  
 
COOPERATIVE PRINCIPLE: 
Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the 
stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the 
talk exchange in which you are engaged. 
 
The activities need not be talk exchanges, as Grice’s examples show 
(e.g. 32); conversations are often held in order to support other practical 
purposes. Social animals like us are geared to expect cooperative behav-
ior from their neighbor; this expectation is innate and corroborated (and 
qualified) by experience.11 Cooperativity of our fellow human beings is 
the default assumption that can, of course, be overridden by negative ev-
idence. Sperber and Wilson, as do many other critics, allege that “Grice’s 
principle and maxims are norms which communicators and audience 
must know in order to communicate adequately” (Sperber and Wilson 
                                                 
11 Aristotle (Politics, 1253a 2-3) regarded man as a “social animal by nature;” Rousseau 
(1762: 289 [End of book IV]) saw “a principle of justice and virtue” to be innate, and Reid 
(1785: 193-195, VI, xxiv) elaborated on his principles of veracity and credulity: “we speak 
truth by instinct” and “in the matter of testimony, the balance of human judgment is by 
nature inclined to the side of belief.” 
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1986, 162). On the contrary: The fact is that it takes quite some intellec-
tual effort not to behave according to Grice’s rules.  
During a conversation one should not say what is irrelevant or with-
hold what is relevant (Grice’s Maxims of Quantity and Relation, 26 f.). 
What one says should be perspicuous (Maxim of Manner) as obscurity 
reduces the relevance of an assertion. Sperber and Wilson 1986 showed 
that Grice’s maxims can be reduced to relevance,12 even including the 
maxim of truth (Wilson and Sperber 2002, 583): 
 
We will argue that language use is not governed by any convention 
or maxim of truthfulness in what is said. Whatever genuine facts 
such a convention or maxim was supposed to explain are better 
explained by assuming that communication is governed by a 
principle of relevance. 
 
Truth is certainly not a sufficient condition for assertion; an assertion 
must be relevant to the activity the speakers are involved in. Is it neces-
sary? 
 
 
2.4. Is Truth Necessary? 
 
The demand for relevance excludes almost all of the true but inappropri-
ate assertions: Of the infinite number of assertions such as ‘zero is less than 
one,’ ‘zero is less than two,’ etc., it excludes all but the one that happens to 
be practically relevant. If truth is not sufficient for assertion – is truth neces-
sary? What is the use of a necessary condition that “reduces” the number of 
“appropriate” assertions to an infinite number? 
Certainly the maxim of truthfulness can be overridden by other norms: 
When commenting on a new haircut or wallpaper or a drawing by a six-
year-old child, truthfulness can be out of place. In most cases relevance 
implies truthfulness (at least sincerity, since the pursuit of truth is a life’s 
                                                 
12 However, despite harsh criticism (Clark 1987, Gorayska and Lindsay 1993 and many 
others) the followers of “Relevance Theory” hold on to the view that relevance is a mere 
cognitive matter independent of goals or practice. 
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work). However, if truth does not support the accepted purpose of the talk 
exchange then relevance wins out.  
A lie is not any false statement. An irrelevant false assertion will be 
simply ignored; a misleading false assertion will be punished, even harder if 
the speaker’s different goals are visible so that the intention to mislead can 
be alleged. On the other hand, a false assertion can even be held in high es-
teem if it discloses intended positive consequences. A classical example 
(from the Dissoi Logoi) is the act of foisting a medicine into a drink prepared 
for one’s father or mother who would refuse to take it otherwise. It is not 
truth what counts but helpful guidance vs. harmful misguidance in the ac-
tivity the assertion forms part of. Truth appears to be the core of assertion 
because in almost all cases only true statements are relevant, but this does 
not exclude the possibility that the important status of truth is derived and 
secondary to relevance. 
There are a considerable number of linguistic structures in utterances 
whose truth cannot be established as opposed to their relevance. One is fu-
ture contingents: ‘There will be a math test tomorrow’ is relevant today 
(when you can do some preparation) and will be irrelevant tomorrow (when 
it’s too late), although its truth can only be established tomorrow, after the 
test. Conditionals are always false because you can always find far-fetched 
conditions that render them false. ‘If you do these exercises, you will pass 
the test’ can be very helpful, despite the fact that the addressee can always be 
hit by lightning before having the opportunity to pass. Considering these 
far-fetched conditions, however, is irrelevant. The same holds for counter-
factuals: ‘If you had done your exercises, you would have passed the test’ can 
be a relevant hint for next time, although its truth can never be established. 
Evaluative statements like ‘This sundae is too big for you’ can be relevant, 
ending a futile discussion and avoiding sickness, although it might never be 
shown as true. A statement like ‘Christ has risen from the dead’ can guide 
successful practice although its truth cannot be shown. Three topics that 
have been thoroughly discussed in Relevance Theory are irony (for example 
Wilson and Sperber 2012, 123-145), metaphor (Wilson and Sperber 2012, 
277 f.) and loose talk (Wilson and Sperber 2012, 59 f.). An utterance like ‘I’ll 
be ready in a second’ is false (and harmless) in most cases, but the relevant 
inferences such as ‘you can wait until I’m done’ remain true. Van der Henst 
et al. 2002 found out that speakers asked to tell the time round up from 3:08 
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to 3.10 even if they have digital watches (Wilson and Sperber 2012, 54, 60), 
in their attempt to make their answer easier to process and thereby more 
relevant. The falsity of an utterance will be ignored if the deviation from 
truth is irrelevant. 
If somebody, let’s say from India, asked me ‘Where did you grow 
up?’ I could think of at least three possible answers: 
 
a) In Haar. 
b) In a suburb, 500 yards outside the city limits of Munich. 
c) In Munich. 
 
Option a) would be true but obscure (as nobody in India will have 
heard of that suburb) and therefore irrelevant. Option b) would be true but 
unnecessarily prolix and therefore less relevant. Option c) would be literal-
ly false but it would still be relevant as it triggers true inferences as ‘He 
grew up in an urban environment, is familiar with Bavarian culture etc.’ I 
would use the false answer c) and not even consider the true alternatives.  
The analysis of metaphor in Relevance Theory is quite revealing (Sper-
ber and Wilson 2012, 277 f.). Consider the utterance: ‘John is a soldier!’ 
The mental concept of a soldier includes a number of attributes that will 
be activated to different degrees dependent on the speech situation: 
 
a) John is devoted to his duty. 
b) John willingly follows orders. 
c) John does not question authority. 
d) John identifies with the goals of his team. 
e) John is a patriot. 
f) John earns a soldier’s pay. 
g) John is a member of the military. 
 
When the utterance is an answer to the question “What does John do 
for a living?,” the inferences f) and g) will be activated, a) and b) will 
probably not even come to the mind of the hearer. The inferences trig-
gered with the hearer are entirely different when the utterance is an an-
swer to the question “Can we trust John to do as we tell him and defend 
the interests of the department in the University Council?” In this case 
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a-d) will be triggered and f-g) will not come to the mind of the hearer, as 
his cognition is geared to picking out the relevant information. He will 
even discard the proposition of the utterance itself. The process of un-
derstanding is the same in both cases; it is not the case that the hearer 
first considers the literal interpretation, discards it, and then comes up 
with the metaphorical interpretation.13 The literal falsity of metaphorical 
utterances is irrelevant. Truth normally goes with relevance; if they are 
in conflict, relevance prevails.  
The constitutive rule of the assertive point can now be defined (alter-
ing Vanderveken’s definition, 1990, 105) as follows:  
 
CONSTITUTIVE RULE OF THE ASSERTIVE POINT: 
The assertive point consists in representing a state of affairs as opti-
mally relevant to the activity the addressee is involved in. 
 
The relevance norm of assertion defines the “good” assertion: 
 
RELEVANCE NORM OF ASSERTION: 
An assertion is regarded as “good” by an observer with respect to an 
activity to the degree the observer judges the utterance as relevant to 
that activity. 
 
 
3. The Relevance of Truth 
 
Does all that mean that truth is irrelevant? Not at all.14 Every subject 
has a theory of the world outside (whose existence, please, should not be 
denied). Let us use a common metaphor: this theory is like a map that 
serves as a guide for our entire life-practice. This map is not a precise 
replica of the world, which would be as useless as a map of Italy to a 
scale of 1:1. Our theory of the world can be as different from the world 
itself as Italy is different from a folded sheet of paper and nevertheless 
                                                 
13 It escaped the attention of Relevance Theoreticians that Weinrich 1966: 43-49 proposed 
exactly the same analysis of metaphor, if in the words of the sixties. 
14 What follows is substantially influenced by Wohlrapp 2014; the errors caused by adapta-
tion and by misunderstanding are of course  my own. 
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serve its purpose. It contains only relevant data (others will never be per-
ceived or soon be forgotten) gathered through experience and organized 
by the mind. This map can again be mapped onto a set of propositions 
that represent the theory (this is the representation of the theory we can 
talk about), a web of beliefs,15 which is one single coherent set of propo-
sitions the subject regards as true. The relations between the proposi-
tions that constitute the web are relations of support, e.g. entailment re-
lations or others used in non-deductive, substantial arguments.16 These 
relations are used in justification. An isolated belief is weaker than one 
embedded in relations of justification. That web, as a whole, is “verified” 
both by its consistency and through successful life-practice.17 Success in 
life-practice confirms the web as a realistic image of the world – as real-
istic as a map that corresponds to the landscape it is supposed to depict. 
We set off with common sense and when we run into a problem, we 
make repairs; cognitive relevance will help find the flaw. The “truths” in 
this web are mere defaults that can be changed whenever doubt comes 
up.18 Social truths are established by communication; the transpersonal 
perspective on these beliefs gives them the appearance of objectivity. Ob-
jective truth can be hoped for but will never be reached by human re-
search, which is harmless as long as our practice is successful. A true 
utterance does not correspond to some “fact” of the outside world but to 
a proposition in the web of beliefs maintained by those who believe it to 
be true because their interaction with the outside world on the basis of 
that belief is successful. Mankind used to be happy with the belief that 
the earth is flat for a long time, with counterevidence patched up as long 
as possible. The observation that the topmost part of incoming ships is 
                                                 
15 A metaphor attributable to Quine/Ullian 1978. 
16 “Substantial arguments” in the sense  used by Toulmin 1958. The web is not closed un-
der entailment: When I believe a set of propositions I do not necessarily believe everything 
that follows from that set because I might not realize the connection. This is not a minor 
problem for intensional semantic theory. 
17 A common misunderstanding of pragmatism results from applying the verification pro-
cess to some particular practice as if an isolated assumption (that helps achieving a particu-
lar goal) would establish truth. 
18 The pragmatist theory of truth gives no reason to pragmatize truth conditional seman-
tics; ‘A entails B’ in the language L means that whoever utters A will be committed to B as 
well by the truth conditional semantic rules of language L. 
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visible first was adapted by the speculation of the sea rising like a back or 
a mountain ridge above the earth level (“on the wide back of the sea,” 
Odyssey, γ 142). ‘That the earth is flat’ was regarded to be true because 
in those days common practice based on that belief was successful and 
counterevidence too weak. Now it is false because we believe otherwise – 
yet we should be aware that some of our truths might be ridiculed by fu-
ture generations. Nevertheless, we have the right to call them truths, just 
like the early Greeks had the right to call their truths “truths.” 
When a speaker makes an assertion complying with the relevance 
norm, the asserted proposition will be suitable for guiding the hearer’s 
activities (Gauker 2007: 132). The cooperative speaker believes it to be 
suitable for the hearer’s activities just as he believes it to be suitable for 
his own corresponding activities he would undertake in the hearer’s po-
sition. Therefore he chooses a proposition from his own web of beliefs, 
that is, from the set of propositions he believes to be true. In this way the 
truth of an utterance follows from its relevance (that is, normally; excep-
tions have been discussed above), and the truth/knowledge norm is de-
rived from the relevance norm. Taken on its own, the truth/knowledge 
norm is far too weak.  
The assertion norm: ‘an assertion ought to be relevant’ can itself be 
asserted – is this assertion true? 
It is true if and only if complying with it leads to successful prac-
tice.19 A true norm is one that leads to successful practice, that is, if and 
only if complying with it leads to social practice that satisfies the agents 
involved in that practice. This works even without reflection: successful 
behavior stays, unsuccessful behavior dies out. If there is disagreement 
among the agents about the success, those who are not satisfied believe 
the norm to be false; a consensus can only be achieved by political ac-
tion, preferably rational discourse. More often than not the entire society 
is mistaken about the truth of a norm, just like about the truth about the 
earth’s shape. There have been many atrocities in history that were ap-
proved of by an alarming number of people who considered themselves 
righteous. The falsity of a norm can only be established by a norm that 
                                                 
19 On a meta-normative level, the relevance norm of assertion is true if and only if it struc-
tures successful descriptions of assertion. 
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turns out to be more satisfactory in practice; of course, a rational dis-
course about norms can be useful for planning repairs, useful for as-
sessing ahead of time whether certain goals are good goals to work for, 
or useful for negotiating conflicts of interest, but it cannot establish the 
truth of a norm. The prohibition of alcohol in the US was a perfectly ra-
tional measure from an armchair point of view but it failed when put to 
practice. On the other hand, the abolition of slavery was successful alt-
hough it took quite some time to convince everybody that it was based 
on a true norm. The range of unsuccessful practice extends from trivial 
cases like a glimpse into a refrigerator, based on the false assumption 
that it contains a bottle of milk, all the way up to the failure of “real so-
cialism,” which took decades to become manifest and is still debated in 
some circles. The truth of a norm is a challenge trophy in political dis-
course. 
In conclusion, successful practice verifies normative propositions in 
the same way as descriptive ones. A web of beliefs (both normative and 
descriptive) that guides successful practice is a realistic image of the 
world. 
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